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Abstract 
This special issue on New Economic Analysis of Law features illuminating syntheses of 
social science and law. What would law and economics look like if macroeconomics were 
a concern of scholars now focused entirely on microeconomics? Do emerging online 
phenomena, such as algorithmic pricing and platform capitalism, promise to perfect 
economic theories of market equilibrium, or challenge their foundations? How did 
simplified economic models gain ideological power in policy circles, and how can they be 
improved or replaced? This issue highlights scholars whose work has made the legal 
academy more than an “importer” of ideas from other disciplines—and who have, 
instead, shown that rigorous legal analysis is fundamental to understanding economic 
affairs. 
 
The essays in this issue should help ensure that policymakers’ turn to new economic 
thinking promotes inclusive prosperity. Listokin, Bayern, and Kwak have identified major 
aporias in popular applications of law and economics methods. Ranchordás, Stucke, and 
Ezrachi have demonstrated that technological fixes, ranging from digital ranking and 
rating systems to artificial intelligence-driven personal assistants, are unlikely to improve 
matters unless they are wisely regulated. McCluskey and Rahman offer a blueprint for 
democratic regulation, which shapes the economy in productive ways and alleviates 
structural inequalities. Taken as a whole, this issue of Critical Analysis of Law shows that 
legal thinkers are not merely importers of ideas and models from economics, but also 
active participants, with a great deal to contribute to social science research. 
 
* * * 
In the film Lost in Translation, actor Bob Harris (played by Bill Murray) travels to Tokyo to 
film a commercial for Suntory whiskey.1 After Murray’s first, weak delivery of the ad’s key 
line (“For a relaxing time, make it Suntory Time”), the director dramatically interrupts the 
filming. Speaking in Japanese, he exhorts Harris to imagine he is at rest in his study. The 
director demands that Harris say the line “slowly, with intense feeling,” looking at the 
camera like it’s an old friend—like Bogart in Casablanca uttering the classic: “Here’s 
looking at you, kid.” Harris, who speaks no Japanese, asks a translator what the director 
said. “He wants you to turn, [and] look at the camera,” the translator replies. “That’s all he 
                                                      
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland. 
1 Lost in Translation (Focus Features 2003). Of course, the scene is not merely a commentary on an 
inadequate translation function, but also a satire of the clueless privilege of an actor lucky enough to be paid 
so much for a brief endorsement. 
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said?” Bob asks, quizzically. “With intensity,” the translator replies, after a quick 
consultation with the frustrated director. 
One of the legal academy’s important roles is to act as a translator, taking the best 
of social science and developing reasoned arguments about the meaning of such findings 
for students, regulators, and judges. Sadly, in the context of law and economics, powerful 
voices in the legal academy and key think tanks have all too often engaged with only a 
subsection of the relevant scholarship. Like Bob Harris’s hapless translator, unable to 
convey the richness of the director’s vision, they offer an impoverished picture of the 
current intellectual landscape. Increasingly data-driven and empirical research is presented 
at conferences, while casebooks on property, torts, and contracts remain mired in toy 
models and simplistic accounts of economic life. Some think tanks present supply and 
demand curves as if they settled important issues. The dominant pedagogy and political 
advocacy identified with mainstream law and economics needs a paradigm shift, or at least 
a shift in focus.2  
Over the past few decades, critical legal scholars have assiduously detailed the 
problems caused by popularizations of dominant law and economics paradigms. Reza 
Dibadj observed in 2003 that “three of the most basic assumptions to the popular law and 
economics enterprise—that people are rational, that ability to pay determines value, and 
that the common law is efficient—while couched in the metaphors of science, remain 
unsubstantiated.”3 In the past fifteen years, conferences run by the American Law & 
Economics Association and the Canadian Law & Economics Association, among other 
entities, have showcased work that tests (and adds nuance) to such assumptions. 
However, in casebooks and classrooms (including ones designed for policymakers and 
judges), simplified versions of economic reality persist.  
Fortunately, many researchers are now correcting this partial vision of the role of 
social science in informing the regulation of commercial life. This special issue on New 
Economic Analysis of Law features illuminating syntheses of social science and law.4 
What would law and economics look like if macroeconomics were a primary concern of 
scholars now focused entirely on microeconomics? Do emerging online phenomena, such 
as algorithmic pricing and platform capitalism, promise to perfect economic theories of 
market equilibrium, or challenge their foundations? How did simplified economic models 
gain ideological power in policy circles, and how can they be improved or replaced? This 
issue highlights scholars whose work has made the legal academy more than an 
                                                      
2 Similar calls have been directed at economics itself. See Alexander Rosenberg, Economics: Mathematical 
Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns? (1992); Alan Jay Levinovitz, The New Astrology, Aeon (Apr. 4, 
2016) (https://aeon.co/essays/how-economists-rode-maths-to-become-our-era-s-astrologers). 
3 Reza Dibadj, Beyond Facile Assumptions and Radical Assertions: A Case for Critical Legal Economics, 
2003 Utah L. Rev. 1155.  
4 The term “new economic thinking” owes some currency to the success of the Institute for New Economic 
Thinking (INET) in updating and improving economic discourse. 
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“importer” of ideas from other disciplines—and who have, instead, shown that rigorous 
legal analysis is fundamental to understanding economic affairs. 
This issue of Critical Analysis of Law features leading scholars who have corrected 
for various shortcomings in the mainstream of legal economic pedagogy and policy 
analysis. Professors Bayern, Kwak, and Listokin offer creative critiques of mainstream 
paradigms. In terms familiar from the philosophy of social science, they complement 
parsimony and methodological individualism with a recognition of the importance of 
scope and holism. There are now many computational efforts to use big data and 
predictive analytics to rehabilitate old paradigms of rational consumers and efficient 
markets; Professors Ranchordás, Stucke, and Ezrachi show that the digital world may be 
susceptible to even more extreme distortion than the types of “real-space” transactions it 
is rapidly displacing. Finally, Professors McCluskey and Rahman offer an alternative to 
mainstream law and economics: a political economy perspective which emphasizes the 
role of legal rules in shaping and even determining economic realities. This introduction 
describes their contributions. 
I. Failures of the Mainstream 
Numerous movements have criticized the mainstream economics curriculum taught at 
most large universities in the United States, Canada, and United Kingdom. For example, 
students at Harvard protested Professor N. Gregory Mankiw’s course (colloquially called 
Ec 10) for biased presentation of a particular ideology as unquestionable economic reality. 
There was a citywide, student-led effort to “demystify, diversify, and invigorate” 
economics in New York City in 2014.5 Numerous organizations have also criticized 
mainstream orthodoxies about topics ranging from trade policy to government deficit 
spending. Core-Econ has produced a new casebook on the economics of inequality, 
sustainability, and innovation. Dozens of books written in the wake of the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2008 raised fundamental questions about the nature of economic 
analysis, and whether it was fit for purpose in an era of extraordinary power inequalities, 
systemic risk in finance, and dangerous climate change. 
 James Kwak’s 2017 book, Economism, was a notable addition to this literature, 
since it so clearly and compellingly showed how failures of mainstream economics 
undermined the well-being of ordinary consumers and citizens.6 Kwak defines 
economism as a misguided belief that simple concepts from introductory economics 
courses explain and describe commercial life so well that they should provide models for 
reasoning about all policy decisions. For example, consider the role of economics in 
health care policy. A simple supply and demand model would predict that licensure 
                                                      
5 Anisha Datta, Columbia Students Help Organize City-Wide Economics Conference, Columbia Spectator 
(Sept. 14, 2014) (http://spc.columbiaspectator.com/news/2014/09/14/columbia-students-help-organize-
city-wide-economics-conference).  
6 James Kwak, Economism: Bad Economics and the Rise of Inequality (2017). 
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requirements would suppress the supply of health care professionals (like doctors and 
nurses). So economists like Milton Friedman counseled policymakers to review such 
requirements with a gimlet eye. Relaxing them could increase the supply of doctors, 
thereby reducing the price of care, so that it is more accessible. Of course, such a policy 
move could also reduce the quality of the care provided: it would permit some unqualified 
practitioners to enter the field. But assessing the quality of health care is hard—it requires 
data on the structure, process, and/or outcomes of care provided. It is much easier to 
simply focus on classic supply and demand curves, mesmerizingly simple depictions of 
actions and reactions upon price and quantity. 
 Economism all too often entails failures of scope, in the name of parsimonious 
theory. To fairly assess health policy, we need to think clearly about quality. Like 
scientism, economism also tends to assume that further simple concepts can solve 
whatever shortcomings arise out of a supply and demand framework. So, in our medical 
example, the hope is that patients will carefully review the quality of their doctor’s or hospital’s 
work.  
Of course, the problem of credence goods undermines economism’s simple 
narratives about markets. It is very hard for someone without a medical degree to assess 
whether his or her doctor has actually lived up to the standard of care in any given 
situation. And there are other discontinuities between the medical market, such as it is, 
and other markets for goods and services. A bad meal may be unpleasant, but a bad 
surgery can be life-threatening. 
In his contribution to this symposium, Kwak explores how lawyers and law 
professors have recapitulated the errors of the popularizers of economics, plying “just-so” 
stories while ignoring evidence contrary to their points of view. Richard Posner, for 
instance, said that a progressive tax would reduce risk-taking; Kwak shows that there was 
readily available counter-evidence even at the time Posner was doing his pioneering work. 
Sadly, this is not an isolated error, nor one Posner eventually stopped making. He has, 
more recently, ignored obvious evidence on how inequality harms society.7 At a 
conference last year, he expressed exasperation at recent efforts to apply antitrust law to 
Google.8 When I asked him if any articles or books written from 2007 to 2017 influenced 
his position on this dimension of digital antitrust, he replied “No—I have judged entirely 
from my use of Google.”9 Economism means never having to be sorry you failed to read 
key literature. 
                                                      
7 Frank Pasquale, Fisking Posner on Inequality, Concurring Opinions (Dec. 16, 2006) 
(https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/12/fisking_posner.html).  
8 Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, Is There a Concentration Problem in America?, 
Mar. 27-29, 2017 (https://research.chicagobooth.edu/stigler/events/single-events/march-27-2017).  
9 Stigler Center, Judge Richard A. Posner in Conversation with Professor Luigi Zingales, YouTube (Mar. 30, 
2017) (https://youtu.be/JRCm_gJ2EOk?t=38m54s). 
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Shawn Bayern shares Kwak’s concern about the scope of economic analysis, as 
well as the partial ways in which it tends to comprehend litigation or transactions. He 
finds that law and economics scholars will often seize upon one consideration in a 
scenario as very important to the proper resolution of a dispute, while downplaying other, 
equally important considerations. For instance, Posner and Rosenfield purport to apply 
economics to the vexing problem of resolving contract disputes when unexpected 
changes in circumstances occur.10 For Posner and Rosenfield, courts should carefully 
consider which party to litigation could have prevented or insured against such risks more 
cheaply than the other, and then, as “an aid to interpretation,”11 read the contract as if it 
assigned this duty to the least-cost-avoider. Of course, that principle immediately runs 
into difficulties with respect to its scope and force: what if very poor people are very 
frequently least-cost-avoiders, because the marginal product of their labor is so low that 
their spending days to prepare for changes in circumstances is less “costly” than better-
paid counterparties’ diversion of effort to such tasks? What if the least-cost-avoider has 
lower costs of preparation that are only an infinitesimal fraction of the amount in dispute? 
In neither case would it seem fair or wise to spend much time at all considering who is the 
least-cost-avoider as a guiding principle in the case. 
Bayern suggests even more problems with the least-cost-avoider principle here, 
including issues of administrability. But his primary challenge is more fundamental. 
Contract law is not primarily about making transactions maximally efficient. It is about 
respecting the preferences of the contractors, consistent with any number of other 
societal goals that may statutorily or via common law restrict the prerogatives of 
contracting parties. That requires courts to examine the entire situation of the contract, 
rather than engaging in premature heuristic shortcuts like the one proposed by Posner and 
Rosenfield.  
Similarly, much of law and economics’ touted parsimony may be due to simply 
running roughshod over rival ways of conceptualizing a dispute. Bayern reconsiders the 
problem of a land buyer who “develops a well-informed hunch that a particular block of 
farmland may have serious potential as a mineral reserve or an oil-drilling site, and does 
not disclose this fact to the incumbent farmer before purchasing the land at a price that 
reflects only agricultural uses.”12 Michael J. Trebilcock presents the issue from both 
utilitarian and deontological perspectives, richly describing an array of moral and 
economic considerations that should inform legal determinations here. By contrast, 
mainstream law and economics has focused on how the legal system can incentivize and 
reward the production of information. Since requiring disclosure would reduce the 
incentive to gather the information in the first place, the mainstream reasoning goes, the 
                                                      
10 Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An 
Economic Analysis, 6 J. Legal Stud. 83 (1977). 
11 Id. at 90. 
12 Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract 107-08 (1993). 
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buyer should not be under an obligation to disclose it before purchase. Bayern 
demonstrates that, even if we assume that narrow goal, there are many ways to achieve it 
other than by endorsing a legal rule that the buyer is under no obligation to disclose his or 
her research before buying the plot of land.  
Moreover, there are many other considerations that should enter the analysis here. 
What are the effects on trust levels in a society once other landowners learn that they 
missed an opportunity?13 Given what we now know about climate change, it is more than 
evident that any valuation of oil here must include not only a market price, but a full 
social accounting of the damage caused by greenhouse gases.14 For mainstream legal 
economists, that may seem an inappropriately imponderable aspect of the problem to 
feature in ordinary legal reasoning. The siren song of parsimony counsels against its 
consideration. However, simplification of legal rules and predictability are only two of the 
many goals of a legal system. Even if wise judges were to decide that climate effects of 
carbon extraction were too remote to be fairly considered in a case concerning duties to 
disclose research on land value, the very fact that such a decision should be made (one 
way or another), suggests the limits of any simple focus on one facet of the problem.15 
Yair Listokin’s article in this issue acutely marks this partiality by demonstrating 
that mainstream law and economics has systematically downplayed the importance of an 
entire branch of economics—macroeconomics—for decades. By focusing on dyadic 
interactions between plaintiffs and defendants, the doctrine has failed to take into account 
the ways in which incentives at the micro-level can lead to unexpected effects at the 
societal level.  
John Maynard Keynes offered a classic example of this kind of reasoning when he 
analyzed the simultaneous individual rationality, and collective irrationality, of individuals 
saving money during a depression. Keynes recognized the “paradox of thrift” in the early 
twentieth century, and it is a counter-narrative to the usual technocratic story of virtuous 
austerity.16 Spending cuts play into the liquidationist illogic of the Ourobouros: those who 
benefit in their role as consumers end up losing out as producers. Governments may save 
budget expenditures by slashing spending, but then undercut the future economic activity 
that generates taxes.17 Austerity threatens to condemn struggling economies to a 
                                                      
13 Stephen Marglin, The Dismal Science: How Thinking Like an Economist Undermines Community (2008). 
14 Nicholas Stern, Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (2006) 
(http://mudancasclimaticas.cptec.inpe.br/~rmclima/pdfs/destaques/sternreview_report_complete.pdf). 
15 Ironically, perhaps only certain very strong versions of natural law theory could support an idea of the 
pursuit of knowledge as a trump card. Consider, for instance, Finnis’s designation of knowledge as an 
intrinsic good in Natural Law and Natural Rights. 
16 On the importance of counternarrative, see Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism, 35 
Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 309 (2016). 
17 A similar problem can occur when vast sums of money in an economy accumulate in, and only circulate 
between members of, a tiny elite. Frank Pasquale, Closed-Circuit Economics, Concurring Opinions (Nov. 
26, 2010) (https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/11/closed-circuit-economics.html); Frank 
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downward spiral of deflation: lower prices, lower pay, and consequent unwillingness of 
consumers to spend even on low-priced goods—leading to even cheaper prices, and a 
reinforcement of the same disastrous dynamic.18 From the United States in the 1930s to 
the Japan of the 2000s, this paradox of thrift has afflicted real economies. And it is clearly 
one of the biggest problems arising out of a future of mass automation, where tens of 
millions of workers may be replaced by machines. A retailer may be thrilled to see self-
driving cars break a taxi drivers’ union (anticipating lower ride costs)—only to find that 
drivers no longer have the money to shop at his store. Moreover, as I pointed out in a 
discussion of “health care macroeconomics” in 2014, microeconomic experts intent on 
cutting health care costs may ultimately undermine larger societal goals of growth and 
inclusion.19 They can be penny wise, but pound foolish. Understandably focused on short-
term cost reduction, they miss opportunities for long-term investment in healthier 
populations, meaningful work, and medical innovation. 
The genius of Keynes’s “paradox of thrift” is that it so clearly encapsulates a story 
about the economy counter to our usual way of thinking. The conventional wisdom is 
that a poor country has to “live within its means”—but maybe efforts to cut back will 
only harm their intended beneficiaries. Listokin follows in this tradition by arguing that 
context matters in legal-economic determination—particularly, whether they are being 
made in a time of deep recession (when interest rates are near zero and unemployment is 
high). A more demanding standard of care in such times may fruitfully incentivize firms 
and individuals to do the type of investment that will otherwise be neglected in lean times. 
Left unchecked by the state, that neglect would, in turn, feed back into the very economic 
conditions that caused it, leading to a vicious circle. Listokin creatively applies Keynesian 
thinking here in order to demonstrate that the judiciary can join the legislative and 
executive branches to fight unemployment and other forms of economic stagnation. 
II. Questioning the Computationalist Project in Contemporary Law and 
Economics 
Kwak, Bayern, and Listokin identify deep problems in popular law and economics that 
can all too often seem blinkered, partial, and simplistic. Perhaps recognizing such 
infirmities, some leading scholars in law and economics have begun to turn to big data, 
algorithms, and other technological advances in order to rescue paradigms of efficient 
markets and rational consumers. But several contributors to this issue question whether 
technology is a panacea for unequal power relations and sharp dealing by powerful market 
                                                                                                                                                          
Pasquale, Capital’s Offense, Boundary2 (Oct. 1, 2014) (https://www.boundary2.org/2014/10/capitals-
offense-laws-entrenchment-of-inequality) (reviewing Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
(2014)).  
18 Frank Pasquale, Dystopia Is to Apocalypse as Deflation Is to Hyperinflation, Concurring Opinions (Dec. 
21, 2008) (https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2008/12/dystopia_apocal.html).  
19 Frank Pasquale, The Hidden Costs of Health Care Cost Cutting, 77 Law & Contemp. Probs. 171 (2014). 
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participants. They show that increases in the amount of information available about 
products, services, firms, and consumers are not necessarily good in themselves. Rather, 
who controls this information, and how they use such control, matters vitally to both the 
efficiency and fairness of markets. 
Information is critical to market design.20 In some models, “perfect information” 
can be a theoretical precondition for the efficient functioning of a market. Less heroically, 
rules of reporting and disclosure are supposed to help consumers understand the relative 
value of a good or service. Persistent surveillance of transactions (and many other 
dimensions of life) promises a wealth of information to guide both businesses and 
policymakers.21 We see this daily online with the personalization of advertising and 
content, which has been optimized for our “data double”—some spectral ensemble of 
past recorded actions that predicts a positive response (such as continued viewing, or 
clicking an ad) from the stimulus provided.22  
Just as physicians advance personalized medicine to better cure diseases, 
advocates of personalized law believe that the high technology tailoring that has been a 
hallmark of digital behemoths (such as Amazon, Apple, Google, and Facebook) can apply 
to regulation.23 Many of Kwak’s, Bayern’s, and Listokin’s concerns focus on failures of 
scope in law and economics—how the right decision in one stylized situation, at one 
given time, would not be efficient in many others (Kwak and Bayern), or even the same 
one at a different time (Listokin). Personalized law aspires to avoid unfairly or inefficiently 
lumping together dissimilar persons or entities.24 Advocates of this approach, including 
Omri Ben-Shahar, Ariel Porat, Lior J. Strahilevitz, Anthony J. Casey, Philipp Hacker, and 
Anthony Niblett, have developed bold, big-data-driven proposals for more precise 
categories aimed at optimal law enforcement.25 Such personalization aims to permit 
governments to fine-tune regulation to enhance the granularity of legal norms. 
Administrability concerns have hampered the application of dynamically tailored legal 
                                                      
20 Philip Mirowski & Edward Nik-Khah, The Knowledge We Have Lost in Information: The History of 
Information in Modern Economics (2017). 
21 Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 Md. L. Rev. 
682 (2013). 
22 Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New 
Frontier of Power (forthcoming 2018). 
23 A draft of this and the next few paragraphs were composed with Julia Powles, for a proposal we plan to 
pursue in future work. 
24 Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws, 102 Calif. L. Rev. 655 (2014). 
25 Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 Ind. L.J. 1401 (2017); Ariel 
Porat & Lior J. Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 Mich. L. Rev. 
1417 (2014); Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 627 (2016); 
Phillip Hacker, Personalizing EU Private Law: From Disclosures to Nudges and Mandates, 25 Eur. Rev. 
Priv. L. 651 (2017). 
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categories, including even the targeting of nudges.26 Big-data-driven approaches are, it is 
projected, a way to solve these concerns. 
Personalized law is an offshoot of behavioral economics and law,27 powered by 
large-scale personal data capture.28 However, personalized law will only be as good as the 
data it is based upon. One of the principal challenges for big data approaches is that data 
sources are prone to inaccuracy. As Rob Kitchin has argued in The Data Revolution, there 
are often inaccuracies in databases that can undermine even well-intentioned personalizers.29  
Sofia Ranchordás exposes many potential problems with a key source of 
information for those legal economists who would use rankings and ratings to substitute 
for (or even inform) legal determinations. Her deeply researched perspective on the role 
of reputation in market transactions roots current debates about online rating and ranking 
sites in categories and models developed decades ago. She canvasses a great deal of 
empirical research to weigh the costs and benefits of reputational mechanisms. She raises 
deep concerns about their objectivity and vulnerability to manipulation.  
Ranchordás’s results are in accord with more general problems in information 
markets. Many firms have an interest in manipulating data, and policymakers have not 
adequately monitored the types of high technology firms that provide information to 
consumers or businesses on a mass scale, in vital contexts.30 The market in personal 
information offers little incentive for high levels of accuracy.31 It matters little to 
purchasers of lists containing detailed personal information whether every entry is 
accurate—they need only a certain threshold percentage of “hits” across the population to 
make a measurable improvement in targeting.32 But to individuals wrongly included on 
derogatory lists, the harm to their reputation and opportunities is great.33  
Both government classification processes, and the data they rely upon, need to be 
improved if they are to realize the promise of personalized law. In the governmental 
realm, enhanced due process protections are needed for victims of suspect 
                                                      
26 See, e.g., Shawn J. Bayern & Melvin E. Eisenberg, The Expectation Measure and its Discontents, 2013 
Mich. St. L. Rev. 1. 
27 Avishalom Tor, The Next Generation of Behavioral Law and Economics, in European Perspectives on 
Behavioral Law and Economics 17 (Klaus Mathis ed., 2015). 
28 Philipp Hacker & Bilyana Petkova, Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: Transparency, Inequality, and 
New Regulatory Frontiers, 15 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 1 (2017); Philipp Hacker, Overcoming the 
Knowledge Problem—Uncertainty, Decision Theory, and Maximin Analysis (Apr. 21, 2017) 
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2632022).  
29 Rob Kitchin, The Data Revolution: Big Data, Open Data, Data Infrastructures and Their Consequences (2014). 
30 Mark Patterson, Antitrust Law in the New Economy (2017). 
31 Frank Pasquale, Reputation Regulation: Disclosure and the Challenge of Clandestinely Commensurating 
Computing, in The Offensive Internet: Privacy, Speech, and Reputation 107 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. 
Nussbaum eds., 2010).  
32 Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (2015). 
33 Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 47 Loyola L. Rev. 515 (2016). 
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personalization. Ranchordás also demonstrates that European regulators are taking 
important steps to rectify this problem, by advancing transparency. Both the UK 
Competition & Market Authority and the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets 
have called the issue a serious problem.  
During the Bush and Obama administrations, United States regulators also took 
the problem seriously, requiring disclosures from sponsored reviews and other 
manipulations of the information environment. Precedents set then remain the law today. 
However, there is a great danger that the Trump Administration will embrace online 
ratings and rankings not merely as a source of information, but as a replacement for 
licensing and regulatory regimes. Who needs to know if their plumber has a license, so the 
logic goes, if the plumber has many five star reviews online? The Trump Federal Trade 
Commission’s Economic Liberty Task Force has eyed such a transition (from licensure to 
online status) as a way to end many occupations’ licensing, displacing extant legal 
structures. According to the usual economic logic, such tiered rating (rather than all-or-
nothing licensure) of workers would expand access to employment and services. Rather 
than having “no plumber at all,” so the logic goes, the poor could now afford to hire a 1-
star or 2-star rated plumber who, while not licensed, could at least perform basic work. 
However, as Ranchordás shows, this perspective ignores the serious limitations of 
these reputational systems, especially in the context of products and services with 
externalities. Widespread reliance on reputational screening without funding extensive 
monitoring and regulation of such screening is an open invitation to abuse, as Google 
found recently when fraudulent addiction rehabilitation centers started hijacking its “user-
generated” rankings in location searches. Policymakers should take Ranchordás’s 
recommendations very seriously, since it is easy to game rating and ranking systems. 
Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice Stucke take on a related problem in the new digital 
economy: how new digital assistants can manipulate those who use them. There is an 
enormous and growing literature in “critical algorithm studies,” which examines the biases 
encoded in algorithms, training data, and other critical components of computational or 
quantitative evaluation.34 Thanks to the movement for algorithmic accountability 
(#algacc), we know that algorithmic corporate decisionmaking is frequently deployed to 
arbitrage around extant anti-discrimination, due process, and media law. Stucke and 
Ezrachi have demonstrated its import for both consumer protection law and competition law.  
In their notable book, Virtual Competition, Stucke and Ezrachi demonstrated that a) 
no intent to evade competition law needs to exist among top executives for their firms’ 
algorithmic pricing strategies to, nevertheless, eviscerate its purposes and policy goals, and 
b) such algorithmic arrangements of information endanger the very foundations of market 
                                                      
34 Tarleton Gillespie & Nick Seaver, Critical Algorithm Studies: A Reading List, SMC Research Blog 
(updated Dec. 16, 2016) (https://socialmediacollective.org/reading-lists/critical-algorithm-studies/). 
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competition.35 Computational power endangers the legitimacy of “free market capitalism” 
by concentrating the very information that market stalwarts like Friedrich von Hayek 
claimed was naturally decentralized and unavailable to any single firm. The extreme 
centralization of knowledge in firms like Google, Amazon, and Facebook could lead to a 
“planned economy,” albeit one planned by CEOs, not government bureaucrats. Critics of 
data brokers have also noted the extreme vulnerability of consumers in an era where the 
firms hide their full data troves from regulators, while sharing them among one another. 
In their essay “Alexa et al., What Are You Doing With My Data?,” Stucke and 
Ezrachi raise fascinating questions about what rational consumers, or efficient markets, 
will look like in a plausible world in which individuals outsource more of their decisions 
to digital assistants like Amazon’s Alexa, Google Home, Apple’s Siri, or others. As faithful 
agents of consumer interests, they might be expected to find consumers ever cheaper 
flights, better routes to get to work, more affordable insurance or groceries. But is that 
trust really warranted? As mentioned above, Google’s search results disserved many 
addicts in search of a reputable rehab center. The commercial relationships between 
Amazon and many of its suppliers are opaque, leading some critics to question whether 
the tens of millions of American citizens who are now Amazon Prime subscribers are 
actually obtaining optimal deals, or are, instead, being shaped into customers who best 
serve the long term interests of the company. For example, once Amazon decided to 
make a big move into groceries (via Amazon Fresh), it aggressively steered some 
customers ordering food toward Amazon Fresh options (which are nearer, but with 
deliveries that come with a $15 per month subscription fee). Amazon Fresh features low 
prices now, but it is by no means clear it will continue to do so if it is able to decimate 
local grocery stores. Indeed, a study on price discrimination has shown that one store 
(Staples) tended to raise prices for those digital consumers whom its algorithms calculated 
did not live near an office supply store.  
Nor are such power plays rare among the most important digital platforms. The 
European Commission demonstrated that Google prioritized its “Google Shopping” 
service above smaller price-comparison services like Foundem, devastating fledgling 
firms.36 While the European Union has fined that behavior as anti-competitive, regulators 
are ill-equipped to monitor the myriad ways that platforms can subtly nudge consumers 
toward one choice, and away from others. Thanks to a combination of cognitive capture 
and the soft corruption of the revolving door, relevant authorities have not required 
regulatory access to the key information, and have not invested in the resources they 
would parse it properly. This problem will only get worse in an era of digital assistants, 
                                                      
35 Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven 
Economy (2016).  
36 Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing 
Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 
2017) (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm). 
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when many recommendations will be ephemerally “voiced” rather than registered as text 
on websites or mobile screens. 
When a firm can gather and continually analyze thousands of data points about 
any given consumer, and adjust its offerings and advertising in real time, the standard 
issue, arms-length relationship between buyer and seller modeled in basic economics 
textbooks becomes woefully inadequate. As Stacy Mitchell of the Institute for Local Self-
Reliance recently observed, “[W]hen third-party sellers post new products, Amazon tracks 
the transactions and then starts selling many of their most popular products.”37 Perhaps if 
extant laws were strictly enforced, massive platforms would be cautious about abusing 
their power. However, at least in the United States, according to New York University 
Professor Scott Galloway, officials are effectively “telling [tech] companies that the smart, 
shareholder-friendly thing to do is obvious: Break the law, lie, do whatever it takes, and 
then pay a (relatively) anemic fine if you happen to get caught.”38 In Mitchell’s words, the 
firms effectively “become the market”; in mine, they become “functional sovereigns.”39 In 
neither case are we dealing with classic interactions within a market—rather, we are facing 
an increasingly political economy, where power is exercised by firms, in a legal 
environment that firms themselves also shaped. 
III. The Political Economy Alternative 
Martha McCluskey has brilliantly exposed the shortcomings of mainstream law and 
economics in a series of articles. In “Defining the Pie, Not Dividing It,” she takes on one 
of the field’s defining moves: an insistence that maximizing gross social output is the 
primary role of law, with distributional concerns relegated to later taxation and transfers. 
The classical assumption here is that there is a “market” that, ideally, operates unimpeded 
by distortions imposed by law.  
 McCluskey demonstrates that the dominant law and economics paradigm of 
temporally sequenced production and distribution is not simply an analytical tool for 
clarity, but an ideologically loaded metaphor. It discredits policymakers’ efforts to 
improve the workplace or to alleviate externalities before machinery is built or work rules 
are set. The idea is to, instead, compensate individuals after the damage has been done, 
once authorities can fully assess the scope and intensity of harm. However, some harms 
are truly irremediable. All the money in the world cannot restore the cognitive capacity of 
                                                      
37 Stacy Mitchell, Amazon Doesn’t Just Want to Dominate the Market: It Wants to Become the Market, The 
Nation (Feb. 15, 2018) (https://www.thenation.com/article/amazon-doesnt-just-want-to-dominate-the-
market-it-wants-to-become-the-market/).  
38 Scott Galloway, Silicon Valley’s Tax-Avoiding, Job-Killing, Soul-Sucking Machine, Esquire (Mar. 2018) 
(https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a15895746/bust-big-tech-silicon-valley/); see also Scott 
Galloway, The Four: The Hidden DNA of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google (2017). 
39 Frank Pasquale, From Territorial to Functional Sovereignty: The Case of Amazon, OpenDemocracy (Jan. 
5, 2018) (https://www.opendemocracy.net/digitaliberties/frank-pasquale/from-territorial-to-functional-
sovereignty-case-of-amazon).  
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someone severely poisoned by lead paint. Moreover, the wealth made by polluters in 
“Time 1” (the time of production) is not sequestered into some apolitical bastion of the 
purely monetary. Instead, those resources all too often marshalled before or during “Time 
2” (the time of political influence over distribution) in order to thwart serious 
redistributive efforts.40  
There is no simple division between the conditions of production and those of 
distribution. Rather, they reciprocally influence one another at all times. Workers with 
some financial reserve (or a strike fund) can walk off the job and either take time to find 
another one, or wait for their current employer to make concessions. Those without such 
support are far more vulnerable. Prior distribution is always influencing the terms of 
current production, and vice versa. 
 McCluskey also shows that the first, temporal simplification of production and 
distribution leads to another, even more misleading metaphor—that of society’s 
economic output as a pie, to be sliced only after it is baked. The pie metaphor, so 
common in standard law and economics frameworks, is truly half-baked: it is a 
simplification of the first simplification, and even more biased. McCluskey gives 
numerous examples where each metaphor is transparently debunked as inappropriate. She 
also shows how specific attention to particular “markets” illuminates the real stakes of 
regulation. The unduly capacious term “market” covers a diverse array of politico-
economic patterns of exchange.41 McCluskey’s article demonstrates that diverse legal 
regimes matter just as much to the composition of society’s economic “pie” as to its 
distribution. 
Sabeel Rahman’s work complements McCluskey’s, showing what can be done 
when a more open and holistic approach to social science informs the academic analysis 
of corporate power. Rahman debunks another misleading metaphor at the core of 
technocratic administration of economic systems—the Hayekian characterization of the 
economy as a spontaneously ordered, chaotic system.42 Rahman aims to replace this sense 
of the chaotic lack of intention in markets with a more concrete sense of the structures 
                                                      
40 For an account of a similar tripartite division (albeit with a strikingly different political valence), see Carl 
Schmitt, Appropriation, Distribution, Production, in Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the 
Jus Publicum Europaeum 324 (G.L. Ulmen trans., 2003) (1950). 
41 Mirowski & Nik-Khah, supra note 20. 
42 There is a deep connection here between Rahman’s critique and those of Ranchordás, Stucke, and 
Ezrachi. Rahman questions the fairness of market ordering; Ranchordás, Stucke, and Ezrachi undermine 
common narratives about the superiority of algorithmic ranking and rating over human judgment. The New 
Chicago School has amended and extended its classic defense of markets by emphasizing the role of big 
data and predictive analytics in overcoming consumers’ lack of knowledge and other distortions. However, 
it is hard to read the work presented in this issue without sensing that algorithms may become a new way to 
rationalize market ordering in the Freudian, as opposed to Weberian, sense. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, 
Algorithms and Markets: The Perfect Excuses, Video Statement for the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (Dec. 
3, 2016) (https://youtu.be/HteGOTWRqO8?t=16m34s). 
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embedded in legal orders that heavily influence, and sometimes even pre-determine, 
economic results (ranging from educational attainment to health disparities and beyond.)  
Rahman identifies a fundamental shortcoming in the law and economics tendency 
toward technocratically meliorist policy interventions. While it is critically important to 
ensure that engines of social mobility are nondiscriminatory and accessible, even the most 
meritocratic arrangements to advance opportunity fail to address the unfairness of a world 
where, for example, three men (Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, and Jeff Bezos) have more 
wealth than 150 million of their fellow U.S. citizens. Neoliberals may work very hard to 
ensure that in the future, everyone has an equal shot at such riches.43 However, improving 
the chances of all to succeed within a given structure does nothing to ensure a more 
egalitarian structure (where, for instance, progressive taxation may keep an individual 
from reaching certain heights of wealth).  
Rahman makes a compelling argument for reviving the “progressive political 
economy” of the early twentieth century to take on the vast power inequalities that 
present economic structures enable. Such political economy would limit the power of a 
CEO like Bezos to extract money from the transactions on Amazon’s mTurk platform 
(where some workers earn as little as a penny from each “human intelligence task” they 
perform).44 It would also curb the profit expectations of real estate developers eager to 
gain from bidding wars on prime property. Rahman provides a framework to help 
policymakers “respond to new forms of private power in a changing economy,” including 
that of powerful internet platforms and financial interests.45  
The early twentieth-century Progressive movement did not seek to regulate 
utilities simply because large firms may not be efficient. They also worried directly about 
the power exercised by such firms: their ability to influence politicians, control an outsized 
share of GDP, and sandbag both rival firms and political opponents. As Rahman has 
explained in earlier work,  
Industries triggered public utility regulation when there was a combination of economies 
of scale limiting ordinary accountability through market competition, and a moral or 
social importance that made the industries too vital to be left to the whims of the market 
or the control of a handful of private actors.46 
There are very few “natural” monopolies. Identifying the list of “foundational goods and 
services” meriting either antitrust action or direct utility regulation inevitably requires a 
mix of political, scientific, and legal considerations on top of economic calculations.47  
                                                      
43 This is also a theme of science fiction popular in Silicon Valley, such as the contest narrative Ready Player 1.  
44 Frank Pasquale, Banana Republic.com, Jotwell (2011) (https://jotwell.com/banana-republic-com/). 
45 K. Sabeel Rahman, Private Power, Public Values: Regulating Social Infrastructure in a Changing 
Economy, 39 Cardozo L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2018) (unpublished manuscript available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2986387), at 50.  
46 Id. at 18. 
47 Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 1 (1993). 
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As Rahman relates, three broad categories of regulation can provide a “21st 
century framework for public utility regulation:” 
1) [F]irewalling core necessities away from behaviors and practices that might 
contaminate the basic provision of these goods and services—including through 
structural limits on the corporate organization and form of firms that provide 
infrastructural goods; 
2) [I]mposing public obligations on infrastructural firms, whether negative obligations to 
prevent discrimination or unfair disparities in prices, or positive obligations to pro-
actively provide equal, affordable, and accessible services to under-served constituencies; 
and 
3) [C]reating public options, state-chartered, cheaper, basic versions of these services that 
would offer an alternative to exploitative private control in markets otherwise immune to 
competitive pressures.48 
These three approaches (“firewalls,” “public obligations” and “public options”) have all 
helped increase the accountability of private power in the past (as Robert Lee Hale’s work 
has shown).49 Cable firms cannot charge a customer a higher rate because they dislike her 
politics. Nor can they squeeze businesses that they want to purchase, charging higher and 
higher rates to an acquisition target until it relents. Nor should regulators look kindly on 
holding companies that would more ruthlessly financialize essential services. 
There are many legal scholars working in fields like communications law, banking 
law, and cyberlaw, who identify the limits of dominant regulatory approaches, but are 
researching in isolation. Rahman’s work, as well as that of many other New Brandeisians, 
provides a unifying framework for them to learn from one another, and should catalyze 
important interdisciplinary work. For example, it is well past time for those writing about 
search engines to explore how principles of net neutrality could translate into robust 
principles of search neutrality.50 The European Commission has documented Google’s 
abuse of its dominant position in shopping services. Subsequent remedial actions should 
provide many opportunities for the imposition of public obligations (such as 
commitments to display at least some non-Google-owned properties prominently in 
contested search engine results pages) and firewalling (which might involve stricter merger 
review when a megafirm makes yet another acquisition).51 
                                                      
48 Rahman, supra note 45, at 2. 
49 Robert Lee Hale, Freedom Through Law: Public Control of Private Governing Power (1952). 
50 Frank Pasquale, When Antitrust Becomes Pro-Trust: The Digital Deformation of U.S. Competition 
Policy, Competition Pol’y Int’l Antitrust Chron. (May 15, 2017) 
(https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CPI-Pasquale.pdf).  
51 See, e.g., List of Mergers and Acquisitions by Facebook, Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/List_of_mergers_and_acquisitions_by_Facebook) (last visited Feb. 16, 2018). 
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Both Rahman and McCluskey offer us a rigorous way of recognizing and 
controlling private power.52 This is work that could lead to fundamental reassessments of 
contemporary regulatory approaches. It is exactly the type of research that state, federal, 
and international authorities should consult as they try to rein in the power of many 
massive firms in our increasingly concentrated, winner-take-all economy.53 
Conclusion: Signs of Hope? 
Economic policy shapes our daily lives, and can be a matter of life and death. Consider, 
for instance, the imposition of austerity on many Asian countries in the wake of the 1998 
crisis. The once-booming economies of Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia 
suddenly collapsed in 1997-1998, when skittish foreign investors sold off massive 
amounts of these countries’ currencies.54 Inflation soon followed, and food prices rose, 
causing a catastrophe akin the Great Depression in the United States. The International 
Monetary Fund offered to help with some forms of credit and aid, but only if its 
“beneficiaries” agreed to slash government budget deficits (in order to inspire confidence 
from investors).55 The required cuts in government spending hurt national health systems, 
and worsened unemployment. The IMF even taxed kerosene (a cooking fuel) in 
Indonesia, causing more hardship.  
IMF technocrats predicted such “shock therapy” would help more than it hurt. 
While Indonesia and Thailand faithfully followed IMF orthodoxy, Malaysia defied the 
organization.56 It imposed capital controls, fixed its exchange rate, and maintained 
subsidies to support its poorest citizens. Unlike Indonesia and Thailand, Malaysia had “no 
significant rise in malnutrition among mothers.”57 Indonesia and Thailand also had very 
troubling disruptions in access to health care, which Malaysia did not experience.58  
Models of “expansionary austerity” predicted that reductions in government 
spending and deficits would “crowd in” private investment by reducing interest rates. But 
the deceptively simple “common sense” of austerity was probably more important in 
media, public forums, and politics. That “common sense” compares a nation in a financial 
                                                      
52 See Tarleton Gillespie & Nick Seaver, Critical Algorithm Studies: A Reading List, Social Media Collective 
Research Blog: Microsoft Research (Dec. 15, 2016) (https://socialmediacollective.org/reading-lists/critical-
algorithm-studies/).  
53 Gustavo Grullon et al., Are U.S. Industries Becoming More Concentrated? (Aug. 31, 2017) 
(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2612047).  
54 Morris Goldstein, The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implications (1998). 
55 Andrew Sheng, From Asian to Global Financial Crisis: An Asian Regulator’s View of Unfettered Finance 
in the 1990s and 2000s (2009).  
56 David Stuckler & Sanjay Basu, The Body Economic: Why Austerity Kills 44-48 (2013). 
57 Id. at 47. 
58 Id. at 52-54. 
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crisis to a family that now has to cut back its budget (due to overspending), or to an 
overeating person who now “tightens the belt” to avoid excess. 
 Ha-Joon Chang, as well as authors in the school of Modern Monetary Theory 
(MMT), have debunked these homely analogies.59 Chang’s approach was largely historical. 
He found that the same countries which insisted upon austerity for others’ financial crises, 
met their own recessions and depressions with stimulative spending and counter-cyclical, 
automatic stabilizers (such an unemployment insurance). While American technocrats 
eagerly pushed government spending cuts for Southeast Asian countries in the midst of 
crisis, America itself embraced spending on public works during its Great Depression (of 
the 1930s) and Great Recession (of 2008-2010). For the Modern Monetary Theorists, the 
analogy of country to family is simply a category mistake. No individual family issues its 
own currency, while most countries do. If a country prints more money to stimulate 
spending, it does not necessarily provoke unsustainable inflation.60 And even if it does 
create some inflationary pressures, those can be a welcome counterbalance to the 
deflationary tendencies of a depression. 
 At first, these ideas were dismissed as heresy. But over time, the work of Chang, 
MMT theorists, and other heterodox thinkers has begun to have an impact. For example, 
the IMF has confessed that the austerity it recommended for Greece had severe negative 
consequences.61 Politicians are now more apt to question economic reasoning once 
accepted as the inevitable outcome of mathematical principles. Heterodox thinking has 
become a significant part of the economic conversation, as discontent with inequality and 
disillusionment with technocratic regulation have both been on the rise.  
 The essays in this issue should help ensure that the turn to new economic thinking 
promotes inclusive prosperity. Listokin, Bayern, and Kwak have identified major aporias 
in contemporary legal economic orthodoxy. Ranchordás, Stucke, and Ezrachi have 
demonstrated that technological fixes, ranging from digital ranking and rating systems to 
artificial intelligence-driven personal assistants, are unlikely to improve matters much 
unless they are wisely regulated. McCluskey and Rahman offer a blueprint for democratic 
                                                      
59 Chang repeatedly criticized the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) handling of the Asian financial 
crises of the late 1990s. Ha-Joon Chang, Korea: The Misunderstood Crisis, 26 World Dev. 1555 (1998); Ha-
Joon Chang, Bad Samaritans (2009). For a characteristic MMT voice, see L. Randall Wray, Modern Money 
Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics for Sovereign Monetary Systems 181 (2012) (discussing the debt 
traps caused by austerity). 
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Fullwiler et al., Modern Money Theory: A Response to Critics (2012) 
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encountered a much deeper-than-expected recession with exceptionally high unemployment. Public debt 
remained too high and eventually had to be restructured, with collateral damage for bank balance sheets that 
were also weakened by the recession.”).  
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regulation, which shapes the economy in productive ways and alleviates structural 
inequalities. Taken as a whole, this issue of Critical Analysis of Law shows that legal thinkers 
are not merely importers of ideas and models from economics, but also active 
participants, with a great deal to contribute to social science research.  
 
 
 
 
 
